Sparked by a tragic incident in Southport, in the northwest of the country, towns and cities across the UK were the sites of far-right provoked, anti-migrant violence during the recent summer of 2024. Misinformation circulated online about the perpetrator of the devastating attack provided the ammunition for violent protests that targeted mosques and refugee accommodation. Whilst the majority of those involved were white middle-aged males, the mobs also attracted a significant number of young people. As of August 16th, 41% of those charged by the courts with disorder offences were aged between 18-30. Another 16% were under 18 years old (ITV News, 2024).

The tragedy and reporting thereof was the catalyst for violence but the cause arguably lies deeper within the dissatisfaction with democratic processes and disingenuous dissemination of anti-migrant rhetoric from political leaders and right-wing media. As our sources of (dis)information change from local channels of gossip and mainstream media to social/digital media silos and political performativity, the sources of hate within the power/knowledge complex become an ever-increasing disembodied focus for traditional authoritarian policing and politicking. For propaganda scholars, rather than concentrating on cancelling the hydra-headed sources – the social media accounts and posts that are far too virally numerous to adequately combat – it is the audience on whom we should be focusing our attention (Fern, 2024). And, whilst at the core of the rioting mobs in the UK were white middle-aged men, seeking legitimacy for extreme masculinity and male violence in defence of lost mythologies attached to Englishness and in defiance of feminist progression (Antonsich & Skey, 2024; Pearson, 2024), such extremism has a reinforcing effect on young male audiences attracted to the ‘manosphere’ (Feltham, 2024).

Critical Education

The 2019 UNESCO global education monitoring report, ‘Migration, Displacement and Education: Building bridges, not walls,’ points to the importance of building media literacy to offset such negative influences. It is acknowledged that whilst developing journalists’ capacities is important for raising awareness about radicalization and the role of the media in that process, through building media literacy skills citizens are able to become responsible, critical media consumers and producers (Kellner and Share, 2007).

“This involves teaching people to examine alternative narratives from credible sources, and empowering students to build their own narratives and evidence-based learning.”

UNESCO (2019:218)

For young people like those who decided to join in with the violence in the UK last summer, such skills are vital but need to be allied with critical thinking and socio-political understanding of cultural diversity and conflict resolution. Whilst the role of formal education in challenging prejudice that leads to young people’s involvement in extremist acts is but one solution it can be crucial in promoting critical dialogue and pluralistic political engagement. Rooted in the dominant discourse at the time linking fundamentalism and religion, Davies (2009) sought to explore the role that critical education might play, noting how,

“Extremism is founded on the notion that there is one right answer, truth or path, and that there are no alternatives. Conversely, critical education is founded on the principle of accepting multiple realities, feeling comfortable with ambiguity and searching for multiple truths, not one truth.”

(Davies, 2009: 192)

The ‘identity politics’ promulgated within the manosphere relies on the promotion of one particular ‘truth’, which incorporates anti-migrant, conflated to mean anti-asylum, rhetoric. Critical education can help young people find their place through a dialogically centred social existence, especially when allied with an acknowledgment and acceptance of difference.

Forced Migration and Extended Contact

In their evaluation of an education program to promote positive intergroup relations among Greek host primary students and refugee background children, Spyropoulou, et al. (2022) observe that although anti-racist interventions are well documented there is a dearth of evidence around the impact of education work specifically aimed at challenging young people’s attitudes around forced migration. They highlight three studies:

  1. Cameron et al. (2006) assessed the effectiveness of extended contact – through friendship storytelling – interventions in changing children’s (5-to 11-years old) attitudes towards refugees and intended behaviours towards hypothetical refugee background children. Results supported the effectiveness of extended contact intervention in improving attitudes towards refugees, but not necessarily intended behaviours.
  2. Turner & Brown (2008) evaluated the longitudinal effectiveness of “The Friendship Project”, a multicultural-antiracist school-based intervention in the UK designed to improve children’s attitudes towards refugees. The program was found to be effective in improving short-term but not long-term attitudes.
  3. Glen et al. (2020) in a study with children aged 8 to 11 years, found that inducing empathy though brief narrative interventions promoted prosocial behaviour towards refugees.

Spyropoulou, et al’s (2022) own research built on that of Turner & Brown (2008) with similar results, though in their discussion they suggest evidence for more long-term change too. Importantly, though, they highlight that the effectiveness of anti-prejudice programs in changing participants’ attitudes is, “moderated by various social factors associated with children’s development of racism and discrimination such as media negative stereotypes about the out-group.” (p3119) So whilst, educational interventions can affect positive change, their impact on young people more likely to exhibit extreme responses may be limited and will only be effective alongside more informal interventions and those that address their understandings of the wider socio-cultural environment through which they are being socialised and through which such xenophobia and intolerance is being reinforced.

Education and Social Cohesion

The ‘After the Riots’ report, coauthored by British Future, Belong and Together, makes a number of recommendations and calls for a National Cohesion Strategy that,

“should boost support for programmes and initiatives that increase social connections between people from different backgrounds.”

(British Future, et al., 2024)

They make the following recommendations which highlight the role of education:

  1. The Department for Education should work with experts to develop curricular guidance and teaching materials to ensure children and young people have greater resilience to online mis/disinformation and extremist narratives.
  2. The Government should make it mandatory for school and college students to engage in activities that deepen their level of contact with their peers from different ethnic, faith and class backgrounds.
  3. The Government should fund community-based conflict resolution initiatives and programmes to increase inter-group social contact, using this work to build an evidence base on successful interventions.

Intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Hewstone & Swart, 2011) does suggest the strongest long-term moderator of antipathy towards others is to make sure that young people have opportunities to engage with ‘out-group members’, within the context of their everyday lives. In that sense, intergroup contact must become part of the rituals and routines of normal life – in digital and physical space. There is a role for all sectors of society to provide stronger alternative messaging which challenges that promoted by the ‘hostile environment’. It is though especially incumbent on our educational structures and institutions which form such a dominant part of young people’s social ecosystem to promote cultures of belonging across diverse groups and prioritise policies which are supportive for pupils who are refugees, as well as those at risk of manospheric seduction. All students should be viewed as future citizens (McIntyre & Abrams, 2021), who shall play their part in defining a common life. In doing so we must foreground the collaborative processes of place-making (at the local, national and international level) that are a vital dynamic for all members of a community in restoratively achieving a more socially cohesive society which is less prone to conflating ‘legitimate grievances’ with anti-social violence.

References

Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge/Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Antonsich, M. & Skey, M. (2024) ‘The trouble with England – why rioting in the UK has not spread to Scotland and Wales,’ The Conversation, 08/08/2024. Available at: https://theconversation.com/the-trouble-with-england-why-rioting-in-the-uk-has-not-spread-to-scotland-and-wales-236423
British Future, Belong & Together (2024) After the Riots: Building the foundations for social cohesion. Available at: https://www.belongnetwork.co.uk/resources/after-the-riots-building-the-foundations-for-social-cohesion/
Cameron, L., Rutland, A., Brown, R., & Douch, R. (2006) ‘Changing children’s intergroup attitudes toward refugees: Testing different models of extended contact,’ Child Development. 77(5):1208–1219.
Davies, L. (2009) ‘Educating Against Extremism: Towards A Critical Politicisation Of Young People,’ International Review of Education. 55:183–203
Feltham, F. (2024) ‘I’m Andrew Tate’s audience and I know why he appeals to young men,’ The Observer [online]. 06/01/2024. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2024/jan/06/im-andrew-tates-audience-and-i-know-why-he-appeals-to-young-men
Fern, R. (2024) ‘Riots in the UK: online propagandists know how to work their audiences – this is what we are missing,’ The Conversation, 04/08/2024. Available at: https://theconversation.com/riots-in-the-uk-online-propagandists-know-how-to-work-their-audiences-this-is-what-we-are-missing-236084
Glen, C., Taylor, L.K. & Dautel, J.B. (2020) ‘Promoting Prosocial behavior toward refugees: Exploring the empathy-attitude-action model in middle childhood.’ In Children and Peace (pp. 71–87). Springer, Cham.
Hewstone, M., & Swart, H. (2011). ‘Fifty-odd years of inter-group contact: From hypothesis to integrated theory.’ British Journal of Social Psychology, 50(3):374-386.
ITV News (2024) ‘UK riots: Jail sentences and community orders handed to individuals involved in unrest,’ ITV News [online]. 23/08/2024. Available at: https://www.itv.com/news/2024-08-07/uk-riots-jail-sentences-handed-to-individuals-involved-in-unrest
McIntyre, J., & Abrams, F. (2021). Refugee Education: Theorising Practice in Schools (1st edition, Vol. 1). Oxford: Routledge.
Pearson, E. (2024) ‘The hypermasculine far right: how white nationalists tell themselves they are ‘protecting’ women and children when they riot,’ The Conversation, 07/08/2024. Available at: https://theconversation.com/the-hypermasculine-far-right-how-white-nationalists-tell-themselves-they-are-protecting-women-and-children-when-they-riot-236250
Turner, R. N. & Brown, R. (2008) ‘Improving Children’s attitudes toward refugees: An evaluation of a school-based multicultural curriculum and an anti-racist intervention,’ Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(5):1295–1328.